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Solitary Confinement, Prisoner Litigation, and the Possibility of a Prison Abolitionist
Lawyering Ethic
Debra Parkes*
The widespread and prolonged use of solitary confinement, or segregation as it is called in
Canadian prisons, is a pressing human rights issue with gendered and racialized dimensions.
Women may be disproportionately put in “the hole” for relatively minor infractions and for mental
health reasons (i.e., ostensibly for their own safety), and Indigenous women and men are vastly
over-represented among those in solitary. Periodically the public catches glimpses of the
inhumanity of solitary confinement through reports of deaths in custody, including Ashley Smith
who died with a ligature around her neck in a segregation cell while correctional officers watched.
Numerous reports have called for independent adjudication of decisions to place or maintain
prisoners in solitary, hard time limits on its use, and, more recently, abolition of the practice
altogether. Yet regular and prolonged solitary confinement remains a management tool in prisons
across the country.
This paper considers the role that litigation might play in ending this human rights crisis,
as well as the relationship of prisoner rights litigation to broader, anti-carceral social movements.
There have been some limited successes in prisoners’ rights litigation in Canada, including a
handful of cases in which particular placements in solitary have been found to violate the Charter.
However, systemic claims that engage issues of institutional security face numerous challenges
including a tendency of judges to defer to correctional and legislative decisions in the prison
context, as well as a fundamental acceptance of the logic of punishment and deprivation through
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incarceration. The paper proceeds in four parts. The first section provides a brief overview of the
widespread use of solitary confinement in Canada’s federal prisons and in provincial and territorial
jails. Next, current litigation seeking an end to solitary confinement in the federal prisons system
is located in the context of a long history of prisoner rights litigation in both the US and Canada.
The third section considers the possibilities and challenges of pursuing prisoner rights litigation
with broader critiques of the carceral state in mind, and the paper ends with some thoughts on the
potential for a prison abolitionist ethic to infuse lawyering efforts.
1.

Solitary Confinement in Canada
Awareness is rising in Canada and around the world that the practice of isolating human

beings in small prison cells with little human contact is harmful, inhumane, and amounts to torture.
In October 2016, Canadians learned about the more than four years that Adam Capay spent in a
Plexiglas-lined, permanently-lit solitary confinement cell in a Northern Ontario jail. Capay is a 23
year-old Indigenous man who is awaiting trial for murder in the Thunder Bay jail whose story
prompted newspaper editorials decrying the inhumanity of his prolonged detention in particularly
brutal conditions of solitary confinement.1 The conditions of confinement experience by Capay
and women such as Ashley Smith and Terry Baker2 who both died in segregation cells at the
federal Grand Valley Institution for Women, are recognized as torture under international human
rights law. In late 2015, the United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted a revised

1

See, e.g., Editorial, “Ontario’s sickening mistreatment of Adam Capay,” The Globe and Mail
(24 October 2016) and Editorial, “Release Adam Capay from solitary confinement,” The Toronto
Star (25 October 2016).
2
Sara Mojtehedzadeh, “Woman who died in prison complained of being tied to her bed,
advocates say,” The Toronto Star (7 July 2016).
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version of the Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners,3 known as the Mandela
Rules after the late President of South Africa who was incarcerated for 27 years, much of that in
solitary confinement, for his leadership of the anti-Apartheid movement.
The Mandela Rules prohibit the imposition of indefinite or prolonged solitary confinement,
and they prohibit it outright for women, children, and people with mental and physical disabilities
whose conditions would be exacerbated by it.4 The Rules define solitary confinement as “the
confinement of prisoners for 22 hours or more a day without meaningful human contact” and
prolonged solitary confinement as “solitary confinement for a time period in excess of 15
consecutive days.”5 In its statement of defence to a recently-filed lawsuit challenging the
constitutional validity of administrative segregation in federal prisons, the Attorney General of
Canada claims that its use of “administrative segregation is different from and not analogous to
the concept of solitary confinement referred to in many foreign jurisdictions and should not be
confused with it.”6 In fact, as the Mandela Rules definition makes clear, solitary confinement is an
umbrella term for the lived reality of isolation in a prison cell for 22 to 24 hours, a reality which is
called by many different names in places of detention around the world. The 15 day marker for
prolonged segregation originated in the Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Convention
Against Torture in 20117 which was, in turn, based on the substantial evidence of mental and
physical harm found in studies of people who experienced solitary for anything other than very

3

UN-Doc A/Res/70/175 (17 December 2015) (“Mandela Rules”).
Mandela Rules, Rule 45(2).
5
Mandela Rules, Rule 44.
6
On file with author.
7
Juan E. Méndez, Interim report of the Special Rapporteur of the Human Rights Council on
torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment, U.N. Doc. A/66/268
(August 5, 2011).
4
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short periods.8 Few, if any correctional authorities call their use of solitary confinement by that
name. It is the nature of the isolating conditions that matters, not the name or policy surrounding
those conditions. Prisoners in administrative segregation and other forms of isolation in Canada
are experiencing solitary confinement and all its attendant harms.
In Canada’s federal prison system, which incarcerates people serving sentences of two
years or more, there were 8,309 placements in administrative (non-disciplinary) segregation in the
2014-2015 fiscal year.9 These placements involved 4,999 prisoners as some individuals had more
than one period of incarceration in segregation. The average length of those placements was 27
days, but many prisoners spent much longer periods in segregation. As noted by the Correctional
Investigator (the federal prison ombudsperson), administrative segregation “is so overused [as a
management tool] that nearly half (48%) of the current inmate population has experienced
segregation at least once during their present sentence.”10
Comparatively little is known about the numbers of people incarcerated in provincial and
territorial segregation cells where external oversight is very limited and records are often not kept
or not released to the public.11 This is a serious gap in accountability because on any given day,

8

See, e.g., Craig Haney, “Mental Health Issues in Long-Term Solitary and ‘Supermax’
Confinement,” (2003) 49 Journal of Crime and Delinquency 124; Stuart Grassian, “Psychiatric
Effects of Solitary Confinement,” (2006) 22 Journal of Law & Policy 235; and Peter Scharff
Smith, “The Effects of Solitary Confinement on Prison Inmates: A Brief History and Review of
the Literature,” (2006) 34 Crime & Justice 441.
9
Office of the Correctional Investigator, “Administrative Segregation in Federal Corrections:
Ten Year Trends,” (28 May 2015) at 4 [“Ten Year Trends”], online: http://www.ocibec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/oth-aut/oth-aut20150528-eng.pdf.
10
Office of the Correctional Investigator, “Annual Report of the Office of the Correctional
Investigator 2014-2015,” (26 June 2015) at 26, online: http://www.ocibec.gc.ca/cnt/rpt/pdf/annrpt/annrpt20142015-eng.pdf.
11
Patrick White, “Solitary confinement reform hindered by gaps in prison statistics,” The Globe
and Mail (28 March 2016). For an argument that
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the vast majority of people incarcerated in Canada are in provincial or territorial jails, either
awaiting trial or serving sentences of less than two years.12 Occasional news stories such as those
about Adam Capay, and the accounts of prisoner advocates provide troubling anecdotal evidence
of the widespread, prolonged, and inhumane use of solitary confinement in provincial and
territorial jails. These correctional systems are even more opaque and unaccountable than the
federal Correctional Service of Canada, although pressure is mounting for correctional
accountability. Recently the Ontario government has started to collected and release more data on
its use of segregation due to pressure from the Ontario Human Rights Commission.13 An access to
information request in Quebec produced some basic data about the number of prisoners held in
segregation for disciplinary and administrative reasons, revealing an upward trend in those
placements.14 Research on segregation placements in a provincial women’s jail in Manitoba,
obtained through costly freedom of information requests,15 revealed an unaccountable – in many

12

In 2014/2015, there were 39,623 adults incarcerated in Canada on an average day, with 24,455
of those adults in provincial/territorial custody and 15,168 in federal custody. Julie Reitano,
“Adult correctional statistics in Canada, 2014/2015,” Juristat 85-002-X (26 March 2016).
13
Amy Dempsey, “Data reveal ‘shocking’ numbers of Ontario inmates in solitary,” The Toronto
Star (1 March 2016).
14
Annabelle Blais, “De plus en plus de détenus envoyés au «trou»” Actualité (20 April 2016),
online: http://www.journaldemontreal.com/2016/04/20/de-plus-en-plus-de-detenus-envoyes-autrou; Response of the Ministry of Public Safety to request #116344 (6 April 2016), online:
http://www.securitepublique.gouv.qc.ca/fileadmin/Documents/ministere/diffusion/documents_tra
nsmis_acces/2016/116344.pdf.
15
In response to my request under the Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act,
C.C.S.M. c. F175, for the 2009 records of the use of segregation in the province’s primary women’s
and men’s jails, the Manitoba government stated that the records did not exist in any producible
form as the only notations were in individual inmate files. Following my appeal to the Manitoba
Ombudsman, the government required me to pay over $5000 in fees for the production of an excel
spreadsheet, itemizing the 167 documented segregation placements in the women’s jail for that
year. My request for the same records for the men’s jail was refused on the basis that the fees
would be prohibitive (there are roughly 10 times more men than women in prison in Manitoba so
the inmate files would be voluminous). The possibilities and challenges of using access to
information processes for social justice research are discussed in Jamie Brownlee & Kevin Walby,
eds, Access to Information and Social Justice: Critical Research Strategies for Journalists,
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cases, lawless – use of solitary confinement, including 27% of documented placements in
administrative (non-disciplinary) segregation listed as for “overflow” and 32% for no documented
reason at all.16
The practice of solitary confinement in Canada is consistent with its discredited but
widespread use as a management tool in correctional systems around the world.17 Peter Scharff
Smith has described how “a belief in the ability to rehabilitate criminals through the use of isolation
regimes became a cornerstone [of the] modern prison system” that developed in the United States
in the early nineteenth century and later that same century in Europe.18 Canadian prisons have been
part of this global phenomenon of proliferating and normalized solitary confinement. However,
there are increasing calls to radically limit or abolish the practice, coming in the media,19 from
civil society groups,20 and in the courts. The next section examines efforts to reign in the
devastating practice of solitary confinement through litigation in the US and Canada.

Scholars, and Activists (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Press, 2015. See also Mike Larsen & Kevin
Walby, Brokering Access: Power, Politics and the Freedom of Information Process in Canada
(Vancouver: UBC Press, 2013).
16
[omitted]
17
Méndez, supra note 7 at 2.
18
Peter Scharff Smith, “Solitary Confinement – History, Practice, and Human Rights Standards,”
(2009) 18 Prison Service Journal 3 at 3.
19
See e.g., Editorial, “Solitary confinement should be rare,” The Globe and Mail (19 January
2015).
20
See e.g., West Coast Prison Justice Society, Solitary: A Case for Abolition (November 2016).
The Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies has long called for the abolition of
segregation for women prisoners: Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies, “A push to
end segregation” (5 November 2016), online: http://www.caefs.ca/category/news/.
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A Short History of Litigation Against Solitary Confinement
a.

United States

The harms of solitary confinement have been evident and its legality questioned from the
earliest days of its use in the United States. In a decision released in 1890, the US Supreme Court
said this about the practice of solitary confinement in a Colorado prison, albeit in non-binding
obiter dicta:
A considerable number of the prisoners fell, after even a short confinement, into
a semi-fatuous condition, from which it was next to impossible to arouse them,
and others became violently insane; others still, committed suicide; while those
who stood the ordeal better were not generally reformed, and in most cases did
not recover sufficient mental activity to be of any subsequent service to the
community.21
The Court found these conditions of confinement to be “an additional punishment of the most
important and painful character” in violation of the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel
and usual punishment. The Court ordered Medley, who has been convicted of murder and
sentenced to death, released from prison despite his conviction. However, they stopped short of
finding that solitary confinement per se violated the Constitution.22
Since Medley, there has been much litigation about solitary confinement in the United
States. However, despite some limits being imposed on particularly harsh conditions or regimes,23
the practice persists with over 80,000 people in conditions of solitary confinement in American

21

In re Medley, 134 US 160 at 168 (1890).
Medley, ibid.
23
Keramet Reiter, “The Most Restrictive Alternative: A Litigation History of Solitary
Confinement in U.S. Prisons, 1960–2006,” (2012) 57 Studies in Law, Politics and Society 69 at
103 [Reiter, “Most Restrictive”].
22
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prisons on any given day.24 As will be further discussed below, the American experience with
prisoner rights litigation against solitary confinement is a cautionary tale for Canadian activists.
Keramet Reiter has documented some of the successes of US prisoner litigation in the 1970s, in
which courts in a number of states decried particularly horrific conditions in solitary (such as dark,
filthy cells where prisoners were denied food or any human contact for days and weeks) and
declared those conditions cruel and unusual in violation of the Eighth Amendment.25 In response,
states built new solitary confinement units that met the minimum standards for space, light, and
other amenities required by courts.26 No court ordered the total elimination of solitary confinement.
Instead, the litigation arguably contributed to legitimizing the pervasive and prolonged use of
solitary confinement, provided certain standards were met.
American prisoners are still litigating in an attempt to reign in the prolonged, indefinite
imposition of solitary confinement, and they are achieving some traction. In 2015, prisoners and
their advocates in California achieved an historic settlement in a class action brought by men
serving prolonged periods – many for decades – in solitary confinement in the Pelican Bay Security
Handling Unit or SHU.27 The extreme nature of the SHU regime was described by the men’s
lawyers:

24

David Fathi, “The United States: Turning the Corner on Solitary Confinement,” (2015) 4 Can
J Hum Rts 167 at 168, citing Reassessing Solitary Confinement: The Human Rights, Fiscal, and
Public Safety Consequences: Hearing Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary,
Subcommittee on the Constitution, Civil Rights and Human Rights, 112th Cong (Washington,
DC: Homeland Security Digital Library, 2012) at 6.
25
Reiter, “Most Restrictive,” supra note 23.
26
Reiter, “Most Restrictive,” ibid.
27
Keramet Reiter, “Unsettling Solitary Confinement in California’s Prisons,” Social Justice blog
(28 September 2015), online: http://www.socialjusticejournal.org/unsettling-solitaryconfinement-in-californias-prisons/ [Reiter, “Unsettling Solitary”].
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At Pelican Bay State Prison alone, more than 500 prisoners had been held in the
SHU for over 10 years, and 78 prisoners had been there for more than 20 years.
They were warehoused in cramped, windowless concrete cells for almost 24
hours a day with no phone calls, infrequent visits through plexiglass preventing
physical contact, meager rehabilitative opportunities, and no opportunity for
normal social interaction with other prisoners. Their indefinite and prolonged
confinement in this torturous isolation was based not on any actual misconduct
but on vague and tenuous allegations of affiliation with a gang. Prisoners were
routinely placed in prolonged solitary confinement for simply appearing on a list
of gang members found in another prisoner’s cell, or possessing allegedly gangrelated artwork and tattoos.28
Lisa Guenther has described the extent to which prisoner activism, the hunger strikes, and a
solidarity movement on the outside, were vital parts of the struggle.29 In settling Ashker v Governor
of California, the state agreed to a new, five-year cap on the amount of time a prisoner could spend
in solitary confinement in the SHU and scrapped the “gang validation” policy which had been a
primary basis for placement in the SHU.30 This is a significant victory in the California context,
and one that is rightly celebrated, but prolonged solitary confinement and a punitive regime of
mass incarceration remain entrenched in correctional law and policy.
b.

Canada

The story of Canadian prisoners challenging solitary confinement in the courts begins in
British Columbia in the early 1970s. Michael Jackson, a lawyer and law professor at the University
of British Columbia represented eight men imprisoned in the BC Penitentiary’s brutal Special

28

Center for Constitutional Rights, “Summary of Ashker v. Governor of California Settlement
Terms,” online: https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/2015-09-01-Ashkersettlement-summary.pdf.
29
Lisa Guenther, “Political Action at the End of the World: Hannah Arendt and the California
Prison Hunger Strikes,” (2015) 4 Can J Hum Rts 33.
30
Center for Constitutional Rights, “Summary of Ashker v. Governor of California Settlement
Terms,” online: https://ccrjustice.org/sites/default/files/attach/2015/08/2015-09-01-Ashkersettlement-summary.pdf.
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Correction Unit (SCU) in a Federal Court challenge to their conditions of confinement.31 The Court
heard evidence of the horrific experiences of prisoners in solitary. Jackson describes some of that
evidence:
Jack McCann gave evidence that in 1967 on three successive days other
prisoners slashed themselves. He was given the job of cleaning up the blood in
their cells. McCann “begged and pleaded to be taken out of solitary.” Yet another
prisoner slashed himself. McCann could take no more and he set himself on fire
in his cell. He described to the court what he saw as the flames engulfed him: “I
remember watching the space beneath the door get bigger. I thought I could
crawl beneath it and be free…. I wanted to get out – I don’t care if I die, I never
want to go back to that position again.”32
In a ground-breaking decision released in 1976, Justice Heald issued a declaration that
imprisonment of these men in solitary confinement amounted to cruel and unusual punishment,
contrary to s. 2(b) of the Canadian Bill of Rights.33 By the time of the decision, all of the plaintiff
prisoners were no longer in the SCU; nevertheless, the finding that their conditions of solitary
confinement were illegal marked the beginning of a modern prisoner rights movement in Canada.
Jackson has chronicled the extent to which federal correctional authorities have subsequently
resisted at every turn calls in numerous reports and commissions of inquiry to limit the use of
solitary confinement in Canadian prisons and to subject its use to external, independent oversight.34
Fast forward 40 years to late 2016 and another group of lawyers in Vancouver is gearing
up for a trial in BC Supreme Court. They will argue that the legislative regime that authorizes
administrative segregation in federal prisons is constitutionally invalid as inflicting cruel and

31

McCann v The Queen, [1976] 1 FC 570 [“McCann”]. See Michael Jackson, Prisoners of
Isolation: Solitary Confinement in Canada (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1983).
32
Michael Jackson, “Reflections on 40 Years of Advocacy to End the Isolation of Canadian
Prisoners,” (2015) 4 Can J Hum Rts 57 at 60.
33
S.C. 1960, c. 44, s. 2(b).
34
Jackson, supra note 32.
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unusual treatment or punishment contrary to s. 12 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.35 They will further argue that the administrative segregation regime violates prisoners’
s. 7 right to life, liberty and security of the person, and the right not to be deprived thereof in
accordance with the principles of fundamental justice. They charge that the regime is arbitrary,
grossly disproportionate, procedurally unfair, and fails to accommodate the needs of people with
disabilities. The claim,36 brought by the British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and the John
Howard Society of Canada as public interest litigants, will include expert and lay witnesses
describing the deep and lasting harms caused by administrative segregation and the extent to which
it is unnecessary and ultimately counter-productive to achieving safety and security.
The trial, originally scheduled for January 2017 has been adjourned to June 2017 and the
parties are apparently in settlement negotiations. At a time when the harms of solitary confinement
are increasingly well-documented, and the constitutional law undergirding the claim has developed
in the claimants’ favour in recent years, the possibility of a settlement raises some concerns. If the
parties agree, for example, to hard time limits on the use of administrative segregation (such as 30day or 15-day limits) or agree to certain new procedures for imposing it, those changes will receive
the imprimatur of constitutionality. Consequently, it will be more difficult in future to argue that
the whole practice of prisoner isolation is cruel, inhumane and therefore, unlawful. The history of
settled prisoner lawsuits is instructive. In 2013, the Correctional Service of Canada settled a
lawsuit brought by BobbyLee Worm, an Indigenous woman who had spent years in solitary

35

Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c
11.
36
British Columbia Civil Liberties Association and John Howard Society of Canada v Canada
(Attorney General), Notice of Civil Claim, British Columbia Supreme Court (19 January 2015),
online: https://bccla.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/01/2015-01-19-Notice-of-Civil-Claim1.pdf
(the “BCCLA/JHS claim”).
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confinement pursuant to a policy regime called the Management Protocol which subjected a small
group of “difficult to manage,” mostly Indigenous women prisoners, to a prolonged regime of
segregation that denied them access to prison programs and basic legislative protections.37 As part
of the settlement, the Management Protocol was formally abolished, but the prolonged solitary
confinement of women prisoners persists under new policies and procedures.
While prisoner litigation is still relatively rare in Canada and courts have sometimes taken
a “hands off” deferential approach to judicial review of correctional decision-making,38 some
significant decisions have been made in favour of prisoners challenging solitary confinement and
in favour of meaningful rights-based judicial review of prison conditions. In the 1980s, the
Supreme Court of Canada held in a trilogy of cases that prisoners have certain procedural rights
when prison officials decide to transfer them to administrative segregation or to high maximum
security units,39 deciding importantly that prisoners have “residual liberty interests” as members
of the general prison population.
More recently, the Supreme Court has strongly affirmed the right of prisoners to seek
habeas corpus review in the provincial superior courts of the lawfulness of their conditions of
confinement. Habeas corpus is the “great writ of liberty” dating back hundreds of years to the days
of the Magna Carta in England, that prohibits and provides a remedy for unlawful detention. In
May v Ferndale Institution,40 the Court ruled that an involuntary transfer from minimum to

37

British Columbia Civil Liberties Association, “Prisoner who spent three-and-a-half years in
solitary confinement wins settlement from federal government,” online:
https://bccla.org/2013/05/media-province-solitaryconfinement/.
38
[omitted]
39
Cardinal and Oswald v Director of Kent Institution, [1985] 2 SCR 643; R v Miller, [1985] 2
SCR 613; and Morin v National Special Handling Unit Review Committee, [1985] 2 SCR 662.
40
[2005] 3 SCR 809.
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medium security was unlawful and repudiated the deferential “hands-off” approach that Canadian
courts had often taken in prisoner litigation.41 Again in Mission Institution in Khela42 the Court
stressed, in response to government arguments that sought to limit habeas corpus review, that this
remedy was crucial in the prison context where it “is in fact the strongest tool a prisoner has to
ensure that the deprivation of his or her liberty is not unlawful.”43 A key feature of the law of
habeas corpus that favours its use in the prison context is the burden of proof: once a prisoner can
show a deprivation of their residual liberty (i.e., through placement in segregation or through
transfer to a higher security institution), the burden shifts to the correctional authorities to prove
that the conditions of confinement and the procedure used to place a prisoner in those conditions,
are lawful.44
While most Canadian prisoners do not have meaningful access to the courts to enforce their
rights due to very limited (and, in some provinces, non-existent) legal aid funding for prisoner
cases,45 we are nevertheless seeing some successful habeas corpus decisions ordering prisoners to
be released from solitary confinement. In 2010, a British Columbia judge held that the conditions

41

May v Ferndale, ibid, at paras 24-32.
[2014] 1 SCR 502 (ruling that the decision of correctional authorities to transfer Khela to a
higher security prison was made without disclosure of relevant information to Khela and was
therefore unlawful for violating principles of procedural fairness).
43
Khela, ibid, at para 29.
44
Khela, ibid, at para 40.
45
In Manitoba, for example, Legal Aid does not provide funding for prisoner rights litigation and
therefore such litigation is virtually non-existent, despite news stories highlighting overcrowded
prisons and suspicious deaths in custody. See, e.g., Jillian Taylor, “Human rights lawyer calls for
public inquiry after 5 inmate deaths,” CBC News (28 October 2016), online:
http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/manitoba/human-rights-lawyer-public-inquiry-5-inmate-deaths1.3826977. In rare cases, lawyers from the Public Interest Law Centre in Winnipeg have been
able to secure limited funding for test cases. See, e.g., Wiebe v Bonnefoy, 2015 MBQB 118
(ruling that the transfer of Wiebe from medium to maximum security was done in violation of
principles of procedural fairness and issuing the writ of habeas corpus granting Wiebe’s return to
medium security).
42
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of solitary confinement experienced by a prisoner awaiting trial for murder amounted to cruel and
unusual punishment in violation of s. 12 of the Charter and a writ of habeas corpus was issued.46
In this case, counsel was able to put a substantial evidentiary record before the court, including the
expert evidence of Craig Haney, a professor of psychology and law at the University of California
Santa Cruz, one of the world’s leading experts on the effects of solitary confinement. Haney visited
the Surrey Pretrial Centre, including the segregation unit where Bacon was incarcerated, and
concluded that Bacon’s conditions of confinement were horrendous. McEwan J. agreed and found
those conditions to be cruel and unusual, stating,
The petitioner is kept in physical circumstances that have been condemned
internationally. He is locked down 23 hours per day and kept in the conditions
Professor Haney described as “horrendous”. These conditions would be
deplorable in any civilized society, and are certainly unworthy of ours. They
reflect a distressing level of neglect. On top of this, the petitioner is only allowed
out at random times. He is denied almost all human contact. His treatment by the
administration and the guards is highly arbitrary and further accentuates his
powerlessness.47
And later:
The respondent is in breach of s. 12 of the Charter in arbitrarily placing the
petitioner in solitary confinement, in failing to appropriately mitigate his
circumstances in solitary confinement, and in unlawfully denying him the other
rights to which he was entitled, significantly threatening his psychological
integrity and well-being. These impositions collectively amount to cruel and
unusual treatment.48
Justice McEwan was not prepared to find that solitary confinement was per se cruel and unusual
punishment, citing a 20 year-old unsuccessful s. 12 claim by convicted serial murder, Clifford

46

Bacon v Surrey Pretrial Services Centre (Warden), 2010 BCSC 805.
Bacon, ibid, at para 292.
48
Bacon, ibid, at para 353.
47
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Olson, who had represented himself.49 However, McEwan J. went on to suggest that future
challenges might be successful: “[w]hile there is a growing sense internationally, as well as in
Canada, that locking a person down for 23 hours per day is an inappropriate way to treat any human
being, the courts remain tethered to the standard of ‘gross disproportionality.’”50
In 2016, federally sentenced prisoners held in segregation at the Edmonton Institution were
ordered released from segregation when they successfully brought an action, self-represented, for
habeas corpus. In finding that the decision to place the men in solitary was procedurally unfair
and therefore unlawful,51 Veit J. had this to say about the relevance of the Mandela Rules:
[94] I conclude that, while the Mandela Rules are not determinative, they
encapsulate an international standard in relation to the treatment of prisoners
which Canada acknowledges; those rules inform, but do not dictate, the result in
a Canadian habeas corpus application.
[95] What we can take from the Mandela Rules is that solitary confinement is a
last resort in the treatment of prisoners. Custodial institutions must be zealous in
limiting the use of that technique to those situations where the use of solitary
confinement is, unfortunately, the only reasonable alternative available to them
to manage what is undoubtedly a difficult population.52
At a time of rising awareness about solitary confinement and inhumane prison conditions,
section 12 Charter claims seem to be achieving more traction in the courts than they did in the
early Charter jurisprudence.53 For example, a recent decision of the Ontario Superior Court found
that the imposition of lockdowns at Maplehurst Correctional Centre violated the rights of a remand

49

R v Olson (1987) 38 CCC (3d) 534 (Ont CA), cited in Bacon, supra note 46 at para 302.
Bacon, supra note 46 at para 313. For further discussion of Bacon, see Lisa Kerr, “Contesting
Expertise in Prison Law,” (2014) 60 McGill Law Journal 43 at 79-84 and [omitted].
51
Hamm v Attorney General of Canada (Edmonton Institution), 2016 ABQB 440.
52
Hamm, ibid, at paras 94-95.
53
[omitted for author anonymity]
50
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prisoner and an immigration detainee who represented themselves in the habeas corpus action.54
Gray J. appointed an experienced human rights lawyer, Barbara Jackman, as amicus curiae given
the important and complex issues at stake. The Court ultimately concluded that the many
lockdowns imposed due to staff shortages amounted to cruel and unusual punishment, stating “I
have little difficulty in concluding that the treatment of the applicants, in their totality, was so
excessive as to outrage standards of decency; was disproportionate; and was degrading. Thus, it
violated s. 12 of the Charter.”55 The Court took the relatively rare step of awarding damages for
the Charter violations: $60,000 to Ogiamien and $25,000 to Nguyen, rejecting the government’s
argument that a simple declaration of rights violation would suffice.
In another case involving self-represented prisoner litigants, Gogan v. Nova Scotia
(Attorney General),56 the Nova Scotia Supreme Court found unlawful the provincial corrections
policy of holding federal prisoners awaiting trial on new charges in Nova Scota in segregation in
a provincial jail. The Court was not prepared to take a deferential approach to correctional
decision-making that imposed solitary confinement, deeming wholly inadequate the government’s
stated justification of overcrowding:
It is unreasonable to make prisoners pay for overcrowding, whether it results
from fiscal restraint or minimum sentences or both, by making them submit to
the agony of solitary confinement. All prisoners are forced to pay for the
government’s choice of overcrowding by being housed in overcrowded jails and
prisons. To compound that with solitary confinement when on remand is
unreasonable because it is so unfair.57
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The habeas corpus application was allowed.58
In another strand of cases, sentencing judges are finding that harsh conditions of
confinement experienced by people awaiting trial – including lockdowns, overcrowding, violence
condoned or perpetrated by staff, and prolonged solitary confinement – amount to cruel and
unusual punishment. Judges in these cases are ordering a reduction in sentence as a remedy
pursuant to s. 24(1) of the Charter which empowers courts to order “such remedy as the court
considers appropriate and just in the circumstances.” In R v Palmantier,59 a judge in the Northwest
Territories held that Palmantier’s pre-trial custody spent in an isolation cell, often without access
to basic necessities such as clothing, a shower, a mattress, and bedding, was “inhumane and
uncivilized,” in violation of s. 12. In a similar vein, in R v Adams,60 the judge credited Adams with
6 years for 20 months of pre-trial custody, the conditions of which cumulatively amounted to a
violation of s. 12. Those conditions included repeated assaults by other prisoners, the failure of
correctional officers to protect Adams, “petty discipline” imposed, and an assault by a correctional
officer.61
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It is important to bear in mind that these cases involving sentence reductions to compensate
for unlawful prison conditions remain relatively rare. Punitive legislation enacted during nearly a
decade of federal Conservative rule brought in, to name just a few changes, more mandatory
minimum sentences,62 limited access to early parole,63 and – of particular significance to the instant
discussion about remedies for inhumane prison conditions – limited the ability of sentencing
judges to order enhanced credit for pre-trial detention.64 Before those changes, judges had
exercised discretion to order that pre-trial custody served in particularly harsh conditions including
lockdowns, double-bunking, and segregation, could be calculated at a rate of three or four days to
one, to reduce the ultimate sentence.65 The possibility of judges reducing sentences as a remedy
for Charter violations as in Palmantier and other cases remains, but there are few reported
decisions making such orders. In addition, rising number of mandatory minimum sentences means
that there may be fewer instances in which a judge will have room to reduce a sentence to
compensate for Charter violations.66
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The cases highlighted here – including a number brought by prisoners without the
assistance of counsel – suggest that at least some judges are receptive to prisoner claims,
particularly those involving solitary confinement. There have also been settlements reached in
human rights claims67 and other systemic claims challenging regimes of solitary confinement,68 as
well as a number of class action lawsuits filed, seeking damages for inhumane conditions, solitary
confinement, lockdowns, and the like.69 Extensive media coverage of the inhumane conditions
experienced by Ashley Smith, Adam Capay and others forms the backdrop for current prisoner
litigation and calls for the abolition of segregation by the Ontario Human Rights Commission,70
former Supreme Court Justice and United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Louise
Arbour,71 and others. At the same time, evidence is mounting that imprisonment is a failed

1 SCR 206 (in which the Court did not find an unjustified near-death beating of the accused by
police to be exceptional). There are no reported cases satisfying this high threshold.
67
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number of public interest remedies including that the Ministry of Community Safety and
Correctional Services would keep and publish statistics about the use of segregation:
http://www.ohrc.on.ca/en/segregation-and-mental-health-ontario%E2%80%99s-prisons-jahn-vministry-community-safety-and-correctional
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Brazeau v Attorney General (Canada), 2016 ONSC 7836 (certifying a class action in relation
to solitary confinement). See also Statement of Claim in Lapple et al v Ontario, court file CV16-558633-OOCP (pending certification) regarding lockdowns in Ontario jails:
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in prisons,” CBC News, online: http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/louise-arbour-segregationinquiry-1.3670487.
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experiment,72 yet it is deeply entrenched in Canadian law. It is therefore worth reflecting on the
possible relationships between prisoner rights litigation and a broader, anti-carceral social justice
strategy.
3.

The Promise and Perils of Prisoner Litigation
Prisons are closed institutions that are resistant to outside scrutiny and accountability.

Despite strong stated commitments to human rights and the rule of law, serious abuses and
illegalities occur with alarming frequency in Canadian prisons and jails. Repeated
recommendations for systemic change to address discrimination and abuse go unheeded, such as
those made annually by the Correctional Investigator. Media coverage and ombuds office reports
can shed light on abuses and illegality, and can occasionally prompt government responses, but
only courts have the power to enforce rights and require meaningful changes to be made. Louise
Arbour remarked pointedly in her 1996 Report of the Commission of Inquiry into Certain Events
at the Prison for Women in Kingston, that in Canadian prisons “[t]he Rule of Law is absent,
although rules are everywhere.”73 She ultimately concluded that judicial oversight of prisons, and
the power of judges to reduce a sentence already in progress to compensate for illegality or serious
abuses, is required in the correctional context to enforce compliance with the law.74 The
BCCLA/JHS Canada lawsuit, seeking a court order that the whole regime of administrative
segregation is constitutionally invalid, follows this logic: the Correctional Service of Canada
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persists in using solitary confinement as a management tool and it falls to the courts to end this
harmful practice.
The American experience with prison litigation concerning solitary confinement is
instructive in a number of ways. Reiter suggests that rights litigation has actually operated to
entrench and legitimize solitary confinement, while tinkering around the edges and
“constitutionalizing” it with some limits.75 However, there is also evidence that litigation can be
part of an anti-carceral agenda, cracking open a window and shedding light on the utter inhumanity
of the practice of imprisonment. Jonathan Simon’s discussion of Brown v Plata,76 in which the US
Supreme Court held that conditions in the California prison system amounted to cruel and unusual
punishment, suggests that litigation can be part of the struggle against mass incarceration.77 He
opens his recent book, Mass Incarceration on Trial: A Remarkable Court Decision and the Future
of Prisons in America, with the words, “Like a biblical flood, the age of mass incarceration is
finally ebbing,”78 and goes on to credit the litigation – combined with other activism and reform
efforts – for bringing about this change. He says that the “litigation revealed a depth of depravity
in California’s prisons that most academic critics, including me, had not imagined.”79 Simon
argues that the court decisions culminating in Brown v Plata “show the way toward a legal
dismantling of mass incarceration.”80
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Keramet Reiter and Natalie Pifer suggest that this view was overly optimistic.81 They note
that Simon’s argument that Brown v Plata facilitated the “dismantling of mass incarceration” is
supported by just one statistic: California had reduced its state prison population significantly in
the year following Brown. However, during the same period county jail populations increased by
17 percent. Reither and Pifer conclude that “the history and implementation of … Plata reveal that
this litigation has contributed as much to the retrenchment of administrative and political power as
to the dismantling of mass incarceration.”82
Writing very recently, Reiter examines two prisoner lawsuits that have had some success
in limiting solitary confinement, finding that in both cases the lawyers leveraged significant critical
investigative reporting and prisoner collective activism, with these elements contributing to the
results.83 She argues for multi-method approaches to reform litigation, while also highlighting
lessons from the history of the use of solitary in the US, in particular that the practice has been
remarkably persistent despite calls for reform or abolition dating back more than a century; that
prisons are opaque and unaccountable; and that the use of solitary is subject to administrative
discretion to which courts tend to be deferential.84
A crucial point that is often not part of prisoner litigation or other prison reform efforts is
an understanding that the persistence of solitary confinement (or other forms of isolation and
inhumane treatment) is rooted in carceral logics. Imprisonment itself creates its own logic and
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imperative for the use of solitary. When people are put in cages, many of them will not respond
well to that environment. They will act out. They will harm themselves or others. Consequently,
they are put in smaller cages (segregation cells) and they do even less well, but they are contained.
The fundamental carceral logic of punishing and caging goes unchallenged. As Allegra McLeod
notes, “despite its more apparent horrors, solitary confinement is simply an extension of the logic
and basic structure of prison-backed punishment—punitive isolation and surveillance—to the
disciplinary regime of the prison itself.”85 She goes on to say that once the initial logic of
imprisonment – stripping people of their capacity to move of their own volition, to interact with
others, and to exercise basic control over their own lives – is accepted as legitimate, solitary
confinement simply applies that logic inside prison walls.86
Herein lies the problem of prisoner rights litigation that is not accompanied by a critique
of carceral logics: if, for example, we seek only to abolish those smaller cages (solitary
confinement) but leave intact the logic of caging people in the first place, then some other
correctional tool or practice will take the place of solitary and we will soon be fighting that.
Drawing on the American experience, Montfort, Hannah-Moffat and Hunter describe how
conditions of solitary confinement have historically been renamed and recalibrated when faced
with exposure and challenge.87 In Canada, we saw this in the aftermath of the Management
Protocol settlement, discussed earlier. With this in mind, the next section considers some of the
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ways that a prison abolitionist ethic might productively inform lawyering efforts to alleviate some
of the harms of incarceration and to contribute to broader, anti-carceral social movements.
4.

A Prison Abolitionist Lawyering Ethic
There is a crucial place in anti-carceral social movements for litigation with and on behalf

of prisoners to obtain release from inhumane conditions of confinement or to seek damages or
sentence reductions to compensate for suffering and illegality. It is vital that prisoners have allies
on the outside who can advocate knowledgeably, strategically, and in their interests. But prisoner
rights advocacy may also have the effect of entrenching correctional logics in constitutionalized
form, thereby undermining broader critiques of the carceral state and efforts to dismantle it.
Fortunately, examples exist of the role that litigation can play in critical social movements,
including prison abolitionist projects. This final section offers some preliminary thoughts on the
contours and possibilities of a prison abolitionist lawyering ethic, identifying some examples of
successful incorporation of abolitionist logic in legal work, and engaging with the oft-cited
distinction between reformist and non-reformist or abolitionist advocacy.88 Allegra McLeod
argues for a prison abolitionist ethic and framework to ground the research and teaching of criminal
law and policy.89 She suggests that “when we are forced to confront what prisons do, we are
compelled to consider the ideological work prison performs. We come to recognize prison, then,
as more than ‘an abstract site into which undesirables are de-posited, relieving us of the
responsibility of thinking about the real issues afflicting those communities from which prisoners
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are drawn in such disproportionate numbers.’”90 McLeod’s analysis rejects the idea that an
abolitionist approach is inconsistent with working through and with the law to expose and seek
redress for the real harms caused by incarceration. The notion of an abolitionist ethic, framework,
or lens through which lawyers and scholars might engage with the criminal law and incarceration
opens up new conversations and possibilities for doing things differently, in the classroom and in
the courtroom.
Examples of lawyers incorporating a prison abolitionist ethic into their work can be found
in a number of jurisdictions. In the US, the National Lawyers’ Guild, which is described on its
website as “the nation’s oldest and largest progressive bar association,” adopted a resolution in
favour of prison abolition in December 2015.91 The Abolitionist Law Centre is a law firm working
in Pennsylvania which states on its website that “[w]orking with prisoners in defense of human
rights has led us to the realization that the prison system – and, in particular, its reliance on solitary
confinement – is part of a larger system that operates according to a logic of violence and
intimidation. Solitary confinement is used to terrorize the prisoner population. .... ALC works
with prisoners, their families, and our allies in order to further efforts to abolish this form of
torture.”92
Benjamin Fleury-Steiner93 has highlighted the influential role that feminist prison
abolitionist ethics and approaches played in the US prisoners’ rights movement in the late 1960s,
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led by imprisoned Black women such as Angela Davis and Assata Shakur. These activists were
skeptical of litigation as a reliable tool for social change, but the movements they formed began to
use litigation in strategic ways, particularly in the years of the Warren Court which decided a
number of important prisoners’ rights cases.94 Again in the 1980s and 1990s, when, as FleurySteiner notes, the US Supreme Court and Congress “were chiseling away at prisoner rights
protections, a grassroots prisoner rights movement was underway”95 and the catalyst for that
movement was Ellen Barry and her organization, Legal Services for Prisoners with Children
(LSPC) which remains a strong prisoner rights group today. Recently, for example, LSPC was cocounsel in Ashker,96 where a historic settlement was reached on behalf of California prisoners held
in solitary confinement. The focus of LSPC’s advocacy was around issues affecting incarcerated
mothers and their children. That early group, which involved Angela Davis and others, formed a
committee of former prisoners, academics, activists, and families of prisoners to organize a
conference, Critical Resistance: Beyond the Prison Industrial Complex, which drew over 3,000
people in 1998. That abolitionist movement prioritized non-state centered action, rather than
litigation. However, activist litigation has continued to play a role in the Critical Resistance
movement.
Abolitionist prison lawyers in the US who are part of the CR movement and who advance
rights litigation on behalf of HIV-positive prisoners carefully balance their broader movement
objectives with providing legal services to their clients and, in effect, being active participants in
a system that legitimizes incarceration as a penal practice.97 For example, Christina Dyer and
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Cassandra Shaylor co-direct an organization in Oakland, California called Justice Now, which is
the first teaching law clinic focused solely on women prisoners and which employs many former
prisoners who do popular education, training, art, and community organizing to raise awareness of
the inhumanity of incarceration. Dyer said in an interview with Fleury-Steiner “I have very little
confidence in litigation affecting social change…. [it] has only really created band-aid reforms at
best.” Notwithstanding that deep skepticism of litigation, Dyer noted that her organization does do
legal work for prisoners, particularly seeking compassionate release for dying prisoners. However,
when they do so, they combine their legal efforts with a media campaign describing the broader
systemic issues and highlighting the way that prisons are a form of state violence.98
Bree Carlton has described how a prison abolitionist ethic, specifically a feminist anticarceral approach, has been integral to social justice campaigns in Victoria, Australia around the
imprisonment of women.99 While acknowledging that well-meaning prison reform efforts often
contribute to prison expansion100 and the legitimation of carceral logics,101 Carlton “explores how
anti-carceral feminists have used reform as a resistance strategy within Victorian antidiscrimination campaigns in the 1980s and 1990s. Placed in historical context, these campaigns
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demonstrate the transformative possibilities and risks associated with the necessary navigation and
pursuit of reformist strategies that is fundamental to a politics and practice of abolition.”102
A number of the feminist campaigners in Carlton’s study are lawyers. Strategic litigation
and the strategic deployment of anti-discrimination claims and analysis was infused with an anticarceral ethic and a deep commitment and connection to the women inside the prison. For example,
the campaigners literally formed a ring around the prison and camped out there in solidarity with
the women. They spoke out regularly and forcefully about the violence of incarceration and
cultivated public support for the women inside, while advocating for their rights.
Returning to Canada, the activism and advocacy of Kim Pate, formerly the Executive
Director of the Canadian Association of Elizabeth Fry Societies (CAEFS) and now a Member of
the Senate, provides an instructive example of a prison abolitionist ethic103 guiding the deployment
of rights and other legal strategies. Throughout her more than two decades with CAEFS, Pate has
formed broad-based coalitions that have called wide attention to the violence and harms of
incarceration, particularly for women, all the while naming the injustices as violations of rights
and demanding accountability, compensation, and decarceration as remedies. Pate is a nonpracticing lawyer who often describes herself a “recovering lawyer” because she sees herself
primarily as an activist and advocate, working in solidarity with marginalized and imprisoned
women. In fact, Pate is a brilliant and creative legal mind who has developed new legal strategies
and built coalitions that have influenced the critical positions taken by many institutions and
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organizations in favour of the decarceration of women. She has engaged strategically with the law,
working with lawyers and in coalition with other social justice groups104 to take positions in habeas
corpus applications,105 coroner’s inquiries,106 and human rights proceedings,107 to seek anticarceral remedies such as the decarceration of women with mental health needs (rather than
advocating for those services to be delivered in a prison setting). Pate insists on seeing prisoners
as rights holders and on using legal mechanisms to seek their release or to lessen and remedy the
harms they experience in prison. She is critical of litigation or law reform efforts that are reformist
in nature and Pate has taught a number of prison law seminars at Canadian law schools, educating
a new generation of lawyers to utilize a range of legal mechanisms within a prison abolitionist
framework.
Collectively, these example drawn from the US, Australia and Canada suggest that a prison
abolitionist lawyering ethic is both possible and useful to broader social movement organizing.
This exploratory look at prison abolitionist lawyering is not meant to be definitive or exhaustive
of this work, but in these examples, we see some common themes: a rejection of carceral logics; a
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focus on strategies to get people out of prison rather than on making prison better; and a deep
commitment to coalition-building and connections to abolitionist and other critical social
movements. The current moment in which public attention is being paid to the inhumanity of
solitary confinement presents an opportunity to consider how a prison abolitionist lawyering ethic
might inform or change the nature of prisoner rights litigation to end this harmful practice.
One element of an abolitionist ethic is to develop legal arguments in a way that rejects
carceral logics, rather than legitimizes them. The carceral logics that produce solitary confinement
in Canadian prisons include, for example, the assumptions that prison can be rehabilitative, that
placement in segregation (or some other more restrictive prison environment) is necessary for
those people who do not adjust to a prison environment, and that (many) prisoners are dangerous
and in need of caging. It is unclear whether the evidence and arguments in the BCCLA/JHS solitary
confinement trial will involve challenging these and other carceral logics. However, the focus of
the claim on “prolonged and indefinite segregation” and the need for limits and oversight suggest
a reformist focus.
Abolitionist thought has long distinguished between reformist and abolitionist projects,108
although, as discussed above, abolitionists have long engaged in campaigns, advocacy and
litigation that seeks to alleviate some of the pains and harms of incarceration. A reformist approach
that does not disrupt or challenge the carceral logics underlying the practice of solitary confinement
can contribute to the expansion and proliferation of carceral sites, as we have seen in response to
a recent review of the practice of segregation in Ontario, led by the former federal Correctional
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Investigator, Howard Sapers.109 The decision two new and improved prisons, with expanded
capacity, has been the primary response of the Ontario government to the report which also called
for hard time limits on the use of segregation and independent oversight of the practice. At the
same time, there are growing Canadian campaigns, such as the NOPE (No on Prison Expansion)
initiative calling for a national moratorium on prison expansion,110 with which prisoner rights
lawyers might productively engage.
The element of seeking non-carceral remedies, rather than improving prisons, is also
challenging for lawyers to navigate. The suggestion is not that lawyers should sacrifice the
immediate well-being of their clients by refusing to argue for improved conditions of confinement
(including medical treatment or transfer to a lower security prison); but rather, that a prison
abolitionist lawyering ethic will necessarily involve critical reflection about the impact of the
claims they pursue and the arguments they make on behalf of prisoners. For example, enforcing a
prisoner’s right to quality mental health care need not always mean arguing that the care should
be delivered in prison. At a conference on solitary confinement held in 2013, Tona Mills, a women
who had spent years in segregation in Canadian prisons, spoke about how advocates on her behalf
were successful in convincing a judge to order that she be placed in a community mental health
facility because prison itself was a risk factor for her.111 Of course, it is not always possible to
secure the release of a client, but in the hands of a lawyer who is “thinking outside the bars,” the
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range of legal options and remedies may be expanded. It would not have been obvious to most
lawyers that such an order would even be possible for a sentenced prisoner.
It is also relatively rare for lawyers to work in connection with abolitionist and other
community organizations, but the work cited above is promising.112 Creative advocacy seeking
non-carceral remedies can be informed by, and accountable to, grassroots campaigns that may seek
to free individual prisoners as part of a broader abolitionist agenda. For example, the contemporary
#FreeBresha and #FreeMarissa, participatory defence campaigns in the United States have been
organized to free Bresha Meadows, a 14 year-old Black teenager and Marissa Alexandar, a Black
mother of three. Both Bresha and Marissa were criminalized and imprisoned for defending
themselves against abusers when the state had failed to protect them. Mariame Kaba says of
participatory defence campaigns that “these short-term strategies need to be placed within a longerterm vision for justice rather than as a substitute for that vision.”113 She goes on to urge that
advocates be mindful of the limitations and dangers of some of these strategies and to consider
how they might reframe this struggle to address systemic racism and criminalization more broadly.
For lawyers who seek to do this work, the challenge is to locate short-term strategies to free
individuals within a larger abolitionist vision. In this way, advocates are accountable to, and
mindful of, the way that their work supports (or not) an abolitionist future.
Thinking about the possibilities of strategically deploying rights language and advocacy in
the context of “movement defence” work (such as lawyering in defence of protestors at the 2010
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G20 summit in Toronto), Irina Ceric suggests that critical scholars and lawyers can be part of
counter-hegemonic struggles and social movements.114 She offers “a preliminary explication of
movement lawyers and activist scholars as organic intellectuals, agents in what Antonio Gramsci
described as ‘the war of position’ in his conceptualization of revolutionary social change.”115 In
this exploratory work, Ceric sketches the contours of reflective critical lawyering that sees law as
both refuge and grievance and that advances analyses of, for example, the “criminalization of
dissent” that go beyond liberal constitutional frames. This kind of critical engagement with
movement lawyering has much to offer prisoner rights lawyers who seek to build and support anticarceral social movements.
There is no question that these elements of a prison abolitionist lawyering ethic – rejecting
carceral logics, seeking non-carceral remedies, and working in coalition – are not an easy fit for
many lawyers. Punishment and incarceration are deeply embedded principles in Canadian law and
rights strategies tend to work within, rather than push the limits, of those boundaries. Beginning
in law school, with few exceptions, lawyers are inculcated into a culture that views incarceration
as entrenched and legitimate social policy. The criminal law treats the purported benefits (public
safety, deterrence, denunciation, rehabilitation) as self-evident, even in the face of substantial
evidence of the institution’s failure to deliver on these promises.116 In this culture, the role of
prisoner rights lawyers is to make prisons more humane and rights-respecting. An abolitionist ethic
therefore entails a cultural shift for lawyers interested in doing this work. Allegra McLeod argues
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that “Abolition as an ethical and institutional framework – as an aspirational horizon for reform –
is not unduly or merely utopian, but orients critical thought and reformist efforts toward
meaningful and just legal, ethical, and institutional transformation to which we might commit
ourselves.”117 A nascent culture of prison abolitionist lawyering has the potential to be part of that
transformation.
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